Euthanasia

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Summary and Conclusion
Notes and Works Cited

The positive law in this paper reflects that law which is the standing code in a particular jurisdiction at a given time. I will focus on the United States primarily. The universally accepted form of constitution for a government is the Social Contract Theory. This is Roman or civil law in contrast to common law or case law descended from the British system. Civil law states what the citizens rights and duties are. It also states the punitive measures in writing for infractions. Common law or case law permits the latitude of discretion in an issue by the judge. The United States system is derived from both traditions (Rhenquist).

            Euthanasia is a classic example of the individual versus the state. How much

 

liberty, the greatest state of freedom, should be enfranchised to the citizen

 

versus the interest of the state?

 

            The case of Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)

 

arrived to the United States Supreme Court. Glucksberg and associates were

 

four physicians who would have provided assistance in dying in Washington

 

State if not for a ban. In the instant case in District Court, they, along with

 

three gravely ill plaintiffs who have died and an organization that counsels

 

people considering physician-assisted suicide, filed suit against Washington

 

State on the ban as unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest protected by

 

the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which extends a personal

 

choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-

 

assisted suicide. Arguments centered on Planned Parenthood of

 

Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, and Cruzan v. Director, Mo.

 

Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261. The Federal District Court concurred

 

concluding that Washington's assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional because it

 

places an undue burden on the exercise of that constitutionally protected liberty

 

 interest. The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed.

 

            The Circuit Courts main point was Washington's prohibition against

 

"caus[ing] or "aid[ing]" a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause, Pp.

 

5-32. It also noted that historically positions reexamining the issue had some

 

successes but not exclusively (Rhenquist).

 

           The original petioners Glucksberg et al. were victorious until the

 

Supreme Court case with Judge Rhenquist reversed and remanded the en

 

banc decision of the Ninth Circuit Court arguing as such (Rhenquist): 4

 

More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo American common law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting suicide was enacted in New York in 1828, Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, § 4, 1828 N. Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 7, p. 661 (1829) The Washington statute at issue in this case, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 (1994), was enacted in 1975 as part of a revision of that State's criminal code. Four years later, Washington passed its Natural Death Act, which specifically stated that the "withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment . . . shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide" and that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing . . .

 

            Rhenquist followed defining the question of state interest as criteria

 

that was met and dispensed with in the majority opinion (Rhenquist):

 

These interests include prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing the serious public health problem of suicide, especially among the young, the elderly, and those suffering from untreated pain or from depression or other mental disorders; protecting the medical profession's integrity and ethics and maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.

 

The position of granting a primary law status to American citizenship was refuted after great deliberation taking into account a great deal of historical precedence. Punishments from the common law era where natural reasoning and natural law had sway within the discretion of the court were dismissed as too harsh. However it was noted that suicide and the like was prohibited and this tradition was taken into account to form the opinion at hand. The result being 79 F. 3d 790, reversed and remanded. The question presented in this case is whether Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not (Rhenquist).

The argument of the Sancticity of Life is reflected here. Deep consideration was given to how government has dispensed with the issue of euthanasia from a historical religious, common law, to the strictly civil decision handed down here. It is to be noted that in order for a writ of certiorari to be granted a constitutional issue must be involved that goes beyond a single individual or a small group of persons. Sancticity of Life not only involves the preservation and giving value to life in all its forms, and recognizing that diversity has assigned different values for life, but also to rescue life.